Pluralism Framework

The value criterion is...ensuring legitimate structures of pluralism.

Here are some of the best justifications for a pluralism framework.

First, any external imposition of a conception of moral good is morally bankrupt – the good depends on the preferences of people 

Mackie 78 Mackie, John L (chair of philosophy in the University of York, a position he held until 1967 when he was instead elected a fellow of University College, Oxford, where he served as praelector). "Can There be a RightBased Moral Theory?" Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3.1 (1978): 350-359

But even this is not enough. A plausible goal, or good for man, would have to be something like Aristotle's eudaimonia: it  would be  in the  category of activity. It  could not  be  just  an  end, a possession, a termination  of  pursuit.  The  absurdity  of  taking satisfaction in the sense in which it is such a termination as the  moral goal is brought out by the  science-fictional  pleasure machine described by Smart.0 But Aristotle went  wrong  in  thinking  that  moral  philosophy  could  determine  that  a  particular  sort of activity constitutes the good for man in general, and  is objectively and intrinsically the  best  way  of  life.  People differ radically about the kinds of  life that  they  choose to pursue. Even this way of putting it  is misleading: in general people do not and cannot  make an  overall  choice  of  a  total  plan  of life.  They choose successively to pursue various activities  from time to time, not once  and for all. And while there is room for other sorts  of  evaluation of  human  activities, morality  as  a  source of constraints  on conduct cannot be  based on such comparative evaluations.’ I suggest that if we set out to formulate a goal-based moral theory, but in identifying the  goal try to take adequate  account of these three factors,  namely that the “goal”  must  belong to the  category  of  activity, that there is not one goal but indefinitely many diverse goals, and that they are  the  objects of progressive (not once-for-all or  conclusive) choices, then our theory will change insensibly into a rights based  one. We shall have to take as central the  right of persons progressively to choose how they shall live.

Prefer this argument – 
a. Value is based on how we perceive it – if people enjoyed pain, pain wouldn’t be bad. Deciding the good for someone else is impossible since good is subjective, which disproves the aff’s theory of value
b. Defense to their framework means there’s a risk of moral error when that ethic is imposed on others since that framework would be flawed. Allowing citizens to choose their own good is more likely to be ethically sound than the aff. 
c. All frameworks are biased by peoples’ culture; people believe in theories consistent with their background views. This is irreconcilable since any theory can be foundationally justified – for example, Kantianism from the structure of reason, or util from experience. 

Second, public policy must be justifiable to all – imposition of any particular good creates a precedent of might makes right 

Borgebund 10 Harald Borgebund PhD. The University of York. Department of Politics. Liberal Constitutionalism: Re-thinking the Relationship between Justice and Democracy. 2010

Simply put, society is made up of conflicting conceptions of the good, and what justice demands is a set of principles acceptable to all, which can be used to resolve disagreements. Crucially, a liberal constitutional order must be based on authority superior to that of particular conceptions of the good, otherwise there is a risk that might makes right. An order where might makes right is problematic from a liberal perspective because such an order easily violates the foundational ideal of equality underpinning liberal constitutionalism. People have an interest in resolving such deep disagreements, but it matters to them how these disagreements are resolved. It is important that they feel the political order they have to obey is one that is acceptable and morally justifiable to them. An important aspect of contemporary political philosophy is to define such a political order. The significance of this point needs to be emphasized. For most members of a society, their lives will go better if not interrupted by social strife and conflict, so the interest and motivation to avoid social conflict is strong. Furthermore, if conflicts and disagreements over deeply held convictions and strong interests can be resolved in ways that are morally justifiable to all members of society this serves as a potentially fruitful political order. In different forms, this issue has preoccupied political philosophers at least since the seventeenth century, and some of the most influential solutions have been cast in terms of a social contract (Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau).

Precludes – 

a. Public policy concerns justification to citizens since political authority is by definition coercive and unequal. Only principles acceptable to others according to their ethical systems can legitimize policies.
b. Democracy is a conglomeration of citizens’ wills since laws are enacted with citizens’ approval. Governments can’t violate those wills since this would be inconsistent with the basis of the state. Outweighs – logical consistency is a prerequisite since all ethical systems require logical reasoning to be proven in a debate.
c. If people disagree with their theory, they won’t obey laws justified by that theory, which makes their theory incapable of motivating people and a useless guide for action. 

Even if their theory is correct, most citizens don’t believe in it, so justification can’t be proven by proving the theory true. The only way to legitimize that theory in the context of public policy is to allow citizens to follow the theory they believe in.

Legitimate deliberation must be non-coercive – the state cannot impose requirements on some so that they respect other people’s preferences.

Dryzek 02 John Dryzek Professor of Social Theory and Political Theory in Australian National University's Political Science Program in the Research School of Social Sciences. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford University Press. 2002

The only condition for authentic deliberation is then the requirement that communication induce reflection upon preferences in non-coercive fashion. This requirement in turn rules out domination via the exercise of power, manipulation, indoctrination, propaganda, deception, expressions of mere self-interest, threats (of the sort thai characterize bargaining), and attempts to impose ideological conformity. Such agents of distortion can be counteracted to the degree of equality in deliberative competence across political actors (for an earlier and more exhaustive statement of v, ll.1t ci.iiiotlUf.4 authentic dt'libvration, see Dryirek, 1990a, esp. pp. 14-19). Authentic democracy can then be said to exist to the degree that reflective preferences influence collective decision.

Thus, the standard is ensuring legitimate structures of pluralism.

[This framework originally and generously contributed by PV Peninsula.]